It’s all well and good for U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns to downplay the new U.S. case of mad cow disease. Hungry Americans seem to be satisfied with this "trust us" approach. But nobody should be surprised if much of the world remains wary of the Bush administration’s reassurances on beef or anything else, in the wake of the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It matters.
Posted by Rhonda Holman
Registered?
Commenting on WE Blog now requires you to be a Kansas.com member. Use the links above to register, if you haven't already, or to log in.Contact us
Follow us
Daily Archives
-
Recent Comments
- Phantom on Open thread 11/22
- Skeptic on Jail consultants straining patience
- Chas on Health care reform would save state money
- cosmos_originally on Open thread 11/22
- Politico on Health care reform would save state money
- Politico on So they said
- Pleefer on Open thread 11/22
- cosmos_originally on Open thread 11/22
- Phantom on Open thread 11/22
- Phantom on Open thread 11/22
11 Comments
Is it “never trust the US government” or “never trust Bush”?
I’m confused!
Joe, Bush IS the U.S. Government at this stage of the game. It would seem that most of the rest of the world refuse to wear their rose colored glasses. It may be common practice for whatever current administration to skew the facts and figures at hand, but this administration has taken that practice to a new height. Noone should be resting easy here.
Hmmm. Seems you left out more players in government. Such as the Legislative branch, which includes your congressional representatives for your population area and two for your State. Also! You forgot the Judical branch. There is the government buearcracy, which answers to no one, and then you have me and you, the people of the United States. If you do not like the Administration, then vote for somebody else. If the person you wanted in the Executive office doesn’t win the election, then tough. Just the way our system is setup.
I’m not defending Bush here! I’m just trying to figure out where to direct the untrustworthyness. Because Bush is not the Government. He is only a small part of a big machine.
Everybody knows that Dick Cheney and Haliburton is the real government. ;)
My, it sure doesn’t take long for a blog to veer off subject. Regardless, the safety of our food supply, beef in this case, is in question. The Ag Dept has folded to pressure by the beef industry and we’re inundated with advertisements by big beef. Problem is, the lobbists for big beef can’t cow foriegn countries into submission, and countries like Japan aren’t going to buy tainted beef. That hits big beef in the pocketbook, right where it hurts. The Ag dept can stall and miss-lead all they want; foriegners don’t want beef that can’t be proven safe. Personally, I won’t eat beef till I know it’s safe.
I like beef, and I’m going to keep on eating it. This weekend, I’ll be BBQing and celebrating our nation’s Independence Day.
Life is good! :)
Is there any truth to the rumor that Bush & Cheney have their beef imported “from” Japan?
Mad cow disease is meaner than Aids. It needs the strongest precautions. I, too, wonder about the safety of beef, and am not about to trust producers or feedlots to do what they are supposed to. All it takes is one worker’s mistake or an unscrupulous low-level manager’s orders, and the beef could be bad.
It isn’t all that hard to eliminate improper feeds, establish proper quality controls, and to audit those controls to assure compliance. That’s probably all the other countries are asking for. They are certainly not focused on irrelevancies like Rhonda’s gratuitous slap about WMD.
According to those who study this stuff, whole cuts of beef are said to be most likely safe. It’s things like beef hot dogs, sausage, unspecified hamburger, or any other processed beef that should be avoided, because these may contain nervous system parts that harbor the deadly prions.
Of course, all beef products would be safer if the processing plants cut out the backbone and major nerves before processing; but they rarely do that.
As the saying goes, the two things you don’t want to watch being made are sausage and politics.
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Subject: USDA: Much Still Unknown About Two US BSE Cases
Date: June 8, 2006 at 1:14 pm PST
6/8/2006 1:19:00 PM
USDA: Much Still Unknown About Two US BSE Cases
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)–The U.S. Department of Agriculture now believes the only two native-born U.S. cows to contract mad-cow disease were infected with a little understood and rare “atypical” strain that throws into question how the animals were infected.
USDA Chief Veterinarian John Clifford told Dow Jones Newswires this week that the latest two cases of BSE in the U.S. – found in Alabama and Texas – are abnormal, differing from the common form of the disease found in Canada and the U.K.
Clifford also said USDA has no plans to change the way it safeguards the U.S. beef supply.
An internal USDA memo stated, “There is no evidence to justify any changes in surveillance methods, disease control, or public health measures already taken in the United States.”
Clifford agreed, saying, “Until the science proves otherwise, we’ll be treating all of these cases as BSE and the normal, typical BSE, and we still feel confident that the safeguards we have in place are effective.”
USDA regulations ban beef from non-ambulatory, or “downer,” animals from the human food supply as well as require that some bovine tissue – such as brain and spinal cord material – considered to be risky for carrying BSE infection be removed before processing.
The U.S. also guards against cattle infection by prohibiting the feeding of bovine material to cattle because of the belief that BSE is spread solely through contaminated feed.
But this “atypical” form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy found in the U.S. might not be spread through feed.
Clifford said he didn’t know if the two U.S. cows were infected through contaminated feed – as most normal cases are – or whether they simply developed the disease spontaneously or by some other way.
There are different theories, Clifford said. “There may be spontaneous cases, but I can’t say that there are or are not at this point in time.”
Linda Detwiler, a consultant to major food companies and former Agriculture Department veterinary disease specialist, said, “There is so much that is unknown about the cases now.”
There are several theories as to how cattle could develop an atypical form of BSE, if it even is BSE that the Alabama and Texas cows contracted, Detwiler said.
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, or TSE, is the umbrella neurological disease category that BSE – also called mad cow disease – falls under, together with the scrapie, traditionally found in sheep.
And one possibility, Detwiler said, is the cows could be contracting a form of sheep TSE, now believed to be transmissable to cattle.
Two things that do seem certain, she said, are that the atypical disease contracted by the two U.S. cows can transmit infection and it is detectable by current forms of testing.
She said French scientists have been successful in using atypical BSE to infect mice, but much is still unknown about transmissibility between cattle or if that is even possible.
The USDA memo said the abnormal BSE found in the Texas and Alabama cows “had different molecular characteristics (from normal BSE) that are similar to a few described cases in France.”
Clifford, talking about the two infected native-born cows, said “there was abnormal prion protein present.” And the cows’ brains didn’t have “the spongiform lesions that you would typically see” in the brains of a traditional BSE case.
“One important question,” USDA said in the memo, “is whether the different types of atypical BSE are transmissible to cattle, and no such evaluations have been done.”
The only traditional case of the more common variety of BSE found in the U.S. was discovered in Washington state in December 2003. That cow, according to USDA, was born and infected in Canada before being sent south to the U.S. Canadian and U.S. officials tracked down the source of infection for that cow and other Canadian animals to contaminated feed produced in western Canada.
But in regards to the native-born BSE cases, USDA said, “There are many unanswered questions about these unusual findings, and additional research is needed to help characterize the significance – or lack of significance – of any of these findings.”
Source: Bill Tomson; Dow Jones Newswires; 202-646-0088; bill.tomson@dowjones.com
http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=43386
Greetings BSE-L et al,
Dr. Detwiler said ;
> And one possibility, Detwiler said, is the cows could be contracting a form of sheep TSE,
> now believed to be transmissable to cattle.
i don’t understand this. we have known for eons that sheep scrapie strains are transmissible to the bovine by the non-forced oral consumption of scrapie tainted feed (USA it would be scrapie tainted, cwd tainted and a bit of TME tainted on top, and who knows about hofa tainted, but you get my drift), but i dont understand this, does Dr. Detwiler mean vertical and or horizontal i.e. lateral transmission i.e. maternal and or casual contact ??? i would like to add, the spontaneous theory of a natural field TSE has never been proven by anyone. transmission of the TSE agent by feed of tainted product has been proven time and time again. …
thank you,
kind regards,
terry
Medical Sciences
Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Cristina Casalone *, Gianluigi Zanusso , Pierluigi Acutis *, Sergio Ferrari , Lorenzo Capucci , Fabrizio Tagliavini ¶, Salvatore Monaco ||, and Maria Caramelli *
*Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d’Aosta, Via Bologna, 148, 10195 Turin, Italy; Department of Neurological and Visual Science, Section of Clinical Neurology, Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Piazzale L.A. Scuro, 10, 37134 Verona, Italy; Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia ed Emilia Romagna, Via Bianchi, 9, 25124 Brescia, Italy; and ¶Istituto Nazionale Neurologico “Carlo Besta,” Via Celoria 11, 20133 Milan, Italy
Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved December 23, 2003 (received for review September 9, 2003)
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are mammalian neurodegenerative disorders characterized by a posttranslational conversion and brain accumulation of an insoluble, protease-resistant isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). Human and animal TSE agents exist as different phenotypes that can be biochemically differentiated on the basis of the molecular mass of the protease-resistant PrPSc fragments and the degree of glycosylation. Epidemiological, molecular, and transmission studies strongly suggest that the single strain of agent responsible for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has infected humans, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. The unprecedented biological properties of the BSE agent, which circumvents the so-called “species barrier” between cattle and humans and adapts to different mammalian species, has raised considerable concern for human health. To date, it is unknown whether more than one strain might be responsible for cattle TSE or whether the BSE agent undergoes phenotypic variation after natural transmission. Here we provide evidence of a second cattle TSE. The disorder was pathologically characterized by the presence of PrP-immunopositive amyloid plaques, as opposed to the lack of amyloid deposition in typical BSE cases, and by a different pattern of regional distribution and topology of brain PrPSc accumulation. In addition, Western blot analysis showed a PrPSc type with predominance of the low molecular mass glycoform and a protease-resistant fragment of lower molecular mass than BSE-PrPSc. Strikingly, the molecular signature of this previously undescribed bovine PrPSc was similar to that encountered in a distinct subtype of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
——————————————————————————–
C.C. and G.Z. contributed equally to this work.
||To whom correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail: salvatore.monaco@mail.univr.it.
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0305777101
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1
Characterization of two distinct prion strains derived from bovine spongiform encephalopathy transmissions to inbred mice
Sarah E. Lloyd, Jacqueline M. Linehan, Melanie Desbruslais, Susan Joiner, Jennifer Buckell, Sebastian Brandner, Jonathan D. F. Wadsworth and John Collinge
MRC Prion Unit and Department of Neurodegenerative Disease, Institute of Neurology, University College, London WC1N 3BG, UK
Correspondence
John Collinge
j.collinge@prion.ucl.ac.uk
Distinct prion strains can be distinguished by differences in incubation period, neuropathology and biochemical properties of disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) in inoculated mice. Reliable comparisons of mouse prion strain properties can only be achieved after passage in genetically identical mice, as host prion protein sequence and genetic background are known to modulate prion disease phenotypes. While multiple prion strains have been identified in sheep scrapie and Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is thought to be caused by a single prion strain. Primary passage of BSE prions to different lines of inbred mice resulted in the propagation of two distinct PrPSc types, suggesting that two prion strains may have been isolated. To investigate this further, these isolates were subpassaged in a single line of inbred mice (SJL) and it was confirmed that two distinct prion strains had been identified. MRC1 was characterized by a short incubation time (110±3 days), a mono-glycosylated-dominant PrPSc type and a generalized diffuse pattern of PrP-immunoreactive deposits, while MRC2 displayed a much longer incubation time (155±1 days), a di-glycosylated-dominant PrPSc type and a distinct pattern of PrP-immunoreactive deposits and neuronal loss. These data indicate a crucial involvement of the host genome in modulating prion strain selection and propagation in mice. It is possible that multiple disease phenotypes may also be possible in BSE prion infection in humans and other animals.
http://vir.sgmjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/85/8/2471
Atypical cases of TSE in cases of TSE in
cattle and sheep cattle and sheep
H. De H. De Bosschere Bosschere
CODA/CERVA CODA/CERVA
Nat. Ref. Lab. Vet. Nat. Ref. Lab. Vet. TSEs TSEs
Belgium
http://www.var.fgov.be/pdf/1100_TSEDAY.pdf
USDA 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND HOW NOT TO FIND BSE CASES (OFFICIAL DRAFT OIG REPORT)
snip…
CATTLE With CNS Symptoms Were NOT Always Tested
snip…
Between FYs 2002 and 2004, FSIS condemned 680 cattle of all ages due to CNS symptoms. About 357 of these could be classified as adult. We could validate that ONLY 162 were tested for BSE (per APHIS records. …
snip…
WE interviewed officials at five laboratories that test for rabies. Those officials CONFIRMED THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SUBMIT RABIES-NEGATIVE SAMPLES TO APHIS FOR BSE TESTING. A South Dakota laboratory official said they were not aware they could submit rabies-negative samples to APHIS for BSE testing. A laboratory official in another State said all rabies-negative cases were not submitted to APHIS because BSE was ”NOT ON THEIR RADAR SCREEN.” Officials from New York, Wisconsin, TEXAS, and Iowa advised they would NOT submit samples from animals they consider too young. Four of the five States contacted defined this age as 24 months; Wisconsin defined it as 30 months. TEXAS officials also advised that they do not always have sufficient tissue remaining to submit a BSE sample. …
snip…
FULL TEXT 54 PAGES OF HOW NOT TO FIND BSE IN USA ;
http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_july_13_ig_rep.pdf
HUMAN TSE USA 2005
Animal Prion Diseases Relevant to Humans (unknown types?)
Thu Oct 27, 2005 12:05
71.248.128.109
About Human Prion Diseases /
Animal Prion Diseases Relevant to Humans
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a prion
disease of cattle. Since 1986, when BSE was recognized,
over 180,000 cattle in the UK have developed the
disease, and approximately one to three million are
likely to have been infected with the BSE agent, most
of which were slaughtered for human consumption before
developing signs of the disease. The origin of the
first case of BSE is unknown, but the epidemic was
caused by the recycling of processed waste parts of
cattle, some of which were infected with the BSE agent
and given to other cattle in feed. Control measures
have resulted in the consistent decline of the epidemic
in the UK since 1992. Infected cattle and feed exported
from the UK have resulted in smaller epidemics in other
European countries, where control measures were applied
later.
Compelling evidence indicates that BSE can be
transmitted to humans through the consumption of prion
contaminated meat. BSE-infected individuals eventually
develop vCJD with an incubation time believed to be on
average 10 years. As of November 2004, three cases of
BSE have been reported in North America. One had been
imported to Canada from the UK, one was grown in
Canada, and one discovered in the USA but of Canadian
origin. There has been only one case of vCJD reported
in the USA, but the patient most likely acquired the
disease in the United Kingdom. If current control
measures intended to protect public and animal health
are well enforced, the cattle epidemic should be
largely under control and any remaining risk to humans
through beef consumption should be very small. (For
more details see Smith et al. British Medical Bulletin,
66: 185. 2003.)
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) is a prion disease of elk
and deer, both free range and in captivity. CWD is
endemic in areas of Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska,
but new foci of this disease have been detected in
Nebraska, South Dakota, New Mexico, Wisconsin,
Mississippi Kansas, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Montana, and
Canada. Since there are an estimated 22 million elk and
deer in the USA and a large number of hunters who
consume elk and deer meat, there is the possibility
that CWD can be transmitted from elk and deer to
humans. As of November 2004, the NPDPSC has examined 26
hunters with a suspected prion disease. However, all of
them appeared to have either typical sporadic or
familial forms of the disease. The NPDPSC coordinates
with the Centers for Disease Control and state health
departments to monitor cases from CWD-endemic areas.
Furthermore, it is doing experimental research on CWD
transmissibility using animal models. (For details see
Sigurdson et al. British Medical Bulletin. 66: 199.
2003 and Belay et al. Emerging Infectious Diseases.
10(6): 977. 2004.)
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/abouthpd-animal.html
SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM
1997 TO 2004. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, and that is
with a human TSE surveillance system that is terrible
flawed. in 1997 cases of the _reported_ cases of cjd
were at 54, to 163 _reported_ cases in 2004. see stats
here;
p.s. please note the 47 PENDING CASES to Sept. 2005
p.s. please note the 2005 Prion D. total 120(8)
8=includes 51 type pending, 1 TYPE UNKNOWN ???
p.s. please note sporadic CJD 2002(1) 1=3 TYPE UNKNOWN???
p.s. please note 2004 prion disease (6) 6=7 TYPE
UNKNOWN???
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html
CWD TO HUMANS = sCJD ???
AS implied in the Inset 25 we must not _ASSUME_ that
transmission of BSE to other species will invariably
present pathology typical of a scrapie-like disease.
snip…
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/01/04004001.pdf
> > >> Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations
> > >> regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
> >
> > snip…end
> >
> > full text ;
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
> >
> >
> > 3.57 The experiment which might have determined whether BSE and scrapie
> were
> > caused by the same agent (ie, the feeding of natural scrapie to cattle)
> was
> > never undertaken in the UK. It was, however, performed in the USA in
1979,
> > when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic
in
> > the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of
Agriculture
> in
> > Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the
> > initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological
> > examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of
> the
> > CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the
> > Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of
> > Agriculture. 33 The results were not published at this point, since the
> > attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been
> > inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences
> > between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995.
Similar
> > studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie
> inocula
> > derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and
> from
> > different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease
> Centre.
> > 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie
> agent,
> > though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of
> > brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm#820543
> >
> >
> >
> > The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or
> > neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr
> > Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of
the
> > project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United
> States
> > Department of Agriculture. 33
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm#820546
> >
> >
> >
> > The results were not published at this point, since the attempted
> > transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been
> inconclusive.
> > The results of the clinical and histological differences between
> > scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar
studies
> in
> > which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula
derived
> > from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from
> > different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease
> Centre.
> > 34 The
> > results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent,
> though
> > pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain
> > lesions characteristic of BSE.
> >
> > 3.58 There are several possible reasons why the experiment was not
> performed
> > in the UK. It had been recommended by Sir Richard Southwood (Chairman of
> the
> > Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) in his letter to the
> > Permanent Secretary of MAFF, Mr (now Sir) Derek Andrews, on 21 June
1988,
> 35
> > though it was not specifically recommended in the Working Party Report
or
> > indeed in the Tyrrell Committee Report (details of the Southwood Working
> > Party and the Tyrell Committee can be found in vol. 4: The Southwood
> Working
> > Party, 1988-89 and vol. 11: Scientists after Southwood respectively).
The
> > direct inoculation of scrapie into calves was given low priority,
because
> of
> > its high cost and because it was known that it had already taken place
in
> > the USA. 36 It was also felt that the results of such an experiment
would
> be
> > hard to interpret. While a negative result would be informative, a
> positive
> > result would need to demonstrate that when scrapie was transmitted to
> > cattle, the disease which developed in cattle was the same as BSE. 37
> Given
> > the large number of strains of scrapie and the possibility that BSE was
> one
> > of them, it would be necessary to transmit every scrapie strain to
cattle
> > separately, to test the hypothesis properly. Such an experiment would be
> > expensive. Secondly, as measures to control the epidemic took hold, the
> need
> > for the experiment from the policy viewpoint was not considered so
urgent.
> > It was felt that the results would be mainly of academic interest. 38
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm#820550
> >
> >
> > http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volume2/chaptea3.htm
> >
> >
> >
> > UKBSEnvCJD only theory Singeltary et al 2006
> >
> >
> > http://www.microbes.info/forums/index.php?act=Attach&type=post&id=13
> >
> >
> > http://www.microbes.info/forums/index.php?showtopic=306
> >
> >
> >
> > CJD WATCH
> >
> > http://www.fortunecity.com/healthclub/cpr/349/part1cjd.htm
> >
> > CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD
> >
> > http://disc.server.com/Indices/167318.html
> >
> >
> > Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
> > P.O. Box 42
> > Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################
US “Atypical” Mad Cow Threat Was Predicted
http://www.prwatch.org/node/4883
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6;
b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6.
CODE
None. Bulk product
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,484 tons
DISTRIBUTION
TN and WV
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE – CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Approximately 2,223 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,220 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
40 tons
DISTRIBUTION
LA and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,150 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
87 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
350 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD
Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher,
50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE
All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as “Do not feed to ruminants”.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION
AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6
CODE
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
27,694,240 lbs
DISTRIBUTION
MI
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,
net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal — 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,
Recall # V-103-6;
e) “Big Jim’s” BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,
Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,
Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,
Carbadox — 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete
Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,
Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying
Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED,
net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-112-6
CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as “Do not feed to ruminants”.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
125 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
?????
DISTRIBUTION
KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD
TSS
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22
71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE — CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),
Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL
FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6
CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION
Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006
Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST
Public Health Service
Food and Drug Administration
New Orleans District
297 Plus Park Blvd.
Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-781-5380
Fax: 615-781-5391
May 17, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06
FEDERAL EXPRESS
OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner
Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products
2621 State Street
Dallas, Texas 75204
Dear Mr. Shirley:
On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).
Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:
You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.
You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.
As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, “Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants.” Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.
This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.
Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.
Sincerely,
/S
Carol S. Sanchez
Acting District Director
New Orleans District
http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm
dont you just love fda’s BSE mad cow feed ban and there triple firewalls :blink: ;) :(
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.
look at the table and you’ll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys
Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)–which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)–is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip…
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
2
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100
grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one
considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it
could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the
same species. This information did not become available until the “attack rate”
experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment
designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure
that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study
and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger
infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time
ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing
scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the
dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
Re: BSE .1 GRAM LETHAL NEW STUDY SAYS via W.H.O. Dr Maura Ricketts
[BBC radio 4 FARM news]
http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
03-025IFA
03-025IFA-2
Terry S. Singeltary
9/13/2005
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)
https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument
Docket No. 03-080-1 — USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA
https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed
Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt
Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 – Substances Prohibited From Use in
Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed
Comment Number: EC -10
Accepted – Volume 2
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html
PART 2
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html
TSS
Subject: US To Ask OIE For Official BSE Status
Date: August 29, 2006 at 3:18 pm PST
8/28/2006 8:00:00 PM
INTERVIEW: US To Ask OIE For Official BSE Status
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)–The U.S. will make a massive submission in September to the World Organization for Animal Health, known commonly by the French acronym OIE, for its decision on the U.S. status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy risk, a government agricultural official said Monday.
J.B. Penn, U.S. Department of Agriculture undersecretary for farm and foreign agriculture services, said the U.S. will not be asking for a specific status level, but rather making a presentation and allowing the OIE to decide for
itself.
“We are going to submit to the OIE a package of information that details our entire experience with this disease,” Penn told Dow Jones Newswires.
“We’re going to let them determine our status and tell us,” he said, but stressed that the submission will show that USDA’s “conclusion is that this disease is very, very rare in our livestock herd.”
The U.S. began restricting what ranchers could feed their cattle in 1996 as means to prevent the spread of BSE even though the disease had not been found here.
It was not until December 2003 that the U.S. discovered BSE in a cow and most foreign markets shut off beef imports from the U.S. immediately. More than two years later Japan, once the largest buyer of U.S. beef, has just resumed scaled-down imports. South Korea, previously the second-largest importer, still bans U.S. beef.
The USDA discovered two more BSE cases after boosting the amount of testing it does around the country in an “enhanced” program that is set to wind down soon.
There are three OIE risk categories: “negligible,” “controlled” and “undetermined.”
“Negligible” status is reserved for countries considered to have the smallest risk of BSE – a cattle disease that can be passed to humans through tainted meat – but Penn stressed it is not imperative for the U.S. to be put in that category for full trading privileges.
“From a practical point of view, in terms of what you can trade, it makes no difference whether you’re in the negligible category or whether you’re in the controlled risk category,” Penn said. “You can trade the full range of products – boneless beef, bone-in beef, variety meats, offal and processed products from animals of any age – if you’re in either one of those categories.”
One country that is still not importing U.S. beef is China. It has offered to buy solely boneless cuts from young cattle under 30 months old, but the U.S. has repeatedly refused, saying all cuts from all cattle should be traded.
USDA Secretary Mike Johanns stressed to China in an August letter – a copy of which was obtained by Dow Jones Newswires – that the U.S. is making its submission to the OIE for a BSE risk status. He offered to share the submission with China.
USDA and OIE officials agree that it should be easier for the U.S. to get a “negligible” status thanks to a recent change in international standards.
Previously, a country had to wait seven years after its latest BSE discovery before it could be considered in the a “negligible” risk. That changed earlier this year. Now countries must wait until 11 years after birth date of the last
native-born cow discovered with the disease. USDA, in March, discovered its latest BSE case in a cow it says was more than 10 years old when it died.
Source: Bill Tomson; Dow Jones Newswires; 202-646-0088; bill.tomson@dowjones.com
http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=63967
> US To Ask OIE For Official BSE Status
WE all know OIE caved into USDA BSE demands of a MRR region, which is nothing more than a legal tool to trade all strains of TSE globally. So for the US to ask the OIE for BSE status is a hoot. WE all know what the status is, it is BSE GBR III and should be BSE GBR IV due to the lies, cover-up, and terribly flawed June 2004 enhanced BSE Surveillance program. …
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)
Last updated: 19 July 2005
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
Report
Summary
Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
Publication date: 20 August 2004
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
[Last updated 08 September 2004]
[Publication Date 20 August 2004]
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.html
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000534-01-vol45.pdf
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000490-vol40.pdf
THE SEVEN 1/2 SCIENTIST REPORT *** ;-)
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf
https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf
Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)
https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument
03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf
Specified Risk Materials (SRMs)
I am in full support of the interim final rule which prohibits SRMs from
being included in food for human consumption. In addition to the list of
tissues published in this rule, I am requesting that additional tissues be
added to the list. These would include dura
(”sheath”) covering the spinal cord and the ENTIRE INTESTINE (from pylorus
to rectum). The scientific justification is provided below. THESE SRMs
should also be prohibited from ANY FDA regulated food or product intended
for human consumption, including but not limited to flavorings, extracts,
etc. …
Dr. Linda Detwiler comments in full;
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf
sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle, if i am not mistaken.
MOST countries that went by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. …TSS
http://www.oie.int/downld/SC/2005/bse_2005.pdf
THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE.
AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures.
IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. …
WHAT ABOUT RISK FACTORS TO OUR EXPORTING/IMPORTING PARTNERS FROM ALL OTHER TSEs IN THE USA, WITH RELATIONS TO SRMs ???
a.. BSE OIE
see full text ;
http://p079.ezboard.com/fwolftracksproductionsfrm2.showMessage?topicID=470.topic
http://blogs.nature.com/news/blog/2006/06/cjdrelated_disease_can_incubat.html
TSS